The Sense of Mineness, co-edited with Manuel García-Carpintero for Oxford University Press (in preparation).
This volume of new essays will focus on the experience of ‘mineness’ or ‘me-ness’, exploring three broad questions: “Does it exist?” (the existence question); “What is it?” (the essence question); and “What is it for?” (the explanatory question). The phenomenon will be studied across different domains, including perception, bodily self-awareness, inner speech, action, emotion, and memory.
The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts. (More…)
I argue that much discussion of the subjective character of experience is affected by a conflation between three different notions, which I label “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. I argue that these notions are not conceptually equivalent. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties. (More…)